[isabelle] PCC'09 Call for Participation



Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software Certification (PCC'09)
                     August 15, 2009, Los Angeles, California, USA
                                     Affiliated with LICS'09.
                          http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/event/pcc09/

                          CALL FOR PARTICIPATION

IMPORTANT DATES

Early registration deadline: July 26, 2009
  http://compilers.cs.ucla.edu/lics-sas09/registration/
PCC'09 workshop: August 15, 2009

PROGRAM

Invited talks:
Kelly Hayhurst, NASA Langley. Mending the Gap, An effort to aid the transfer of formal methods technology

  Andrew Appel, Princeton.    TBA

Workshop talks:
  Juan Chen.   Efficient Type Representation in TAL

Nurlida Basir, Bernd Fischer and Ewen Denney. Deriving Safety Cases from Machine-Generated Proofs

Soonho Kong, Wontae Choi and Kwangkeun Yi. PCC Framework for Program Generators

Sagar Chaki, Arie Gurfinkel, Kurt Wallnau and Charles Weinstock. Assurance Cases for Proofs as Evidence

David Pichardie. Towards a Certified Lightweight Array Bound Checker for Java Bytecode

Andrzej Filinski, Anders Starcke Henriksen, Fritz Henglein. Towards PCC for Concurrent and Distributed Systems

Thomas Jensen. Proof compression and the Mobius PCC architecture for embedded devices

SCOPE

Software certification demonstrates the reliability, safety, or
security of software systems in such a way that it can be checked by
an independent authority with minimal trust in the techniques and
tools used in the certification process itself. It can build on
existing validation and verification (V&V) techniques but introduces
the notion of explicit software certificates, which contain all the
information necessary for an independent assessment of the
demonstrated properties. One such example is proof-carrying code (PCC)
which is an important and distinctive approach to enhancing trust in
programs. It provides a practical framework for independent assurance
of program behaviour; especially where source code is not available,
or the code author and user are unknown to each other.

The workshop will address theoretical foundations of logic-based
software certification as well as practical examples and work on
alternative application domains. Here "certificate" is construed
broadly, to include not just mathematical derivations and proofs but
also safety and assurance cases, or any formal evidence that supports
the semantic analysis of programs: that is, evidence about an
intrinsic property of code and its behaviour that can be independently
checked by any user, intermediary, or third party. These guarantees
mean that software certificates raise trust in the code itself,
distinct from and complementary to any existing trust in the creator
of the code, the process used to produce it, or its distributor.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

David Aspinall, University of Edinburgh
Gilles Barthe, IMDEA Software
Ewen Denney, RIACS/NASA Ames, co-chair
Bernd Fischer, University of Southampton
Sofia Guerra, Adelard
Kelly Hayhurst, NASA Langley
Thomas Jensen, IRISA/CNRS, co-chair
David Pichardie, INRIA
Germán Puebla, Technical University of Madrid
Ian Stark, University of Edinburgh







This archive was generated by a fusion of Pipermail (Mailman edition) and MHonArc.